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A	rational	backlash	against	globalisation
The	vote	for	Brexit	and	the	election	of	protectionist	Donald	Trump	to	the	US
presidency	–	two	momentous	markers	of	the	ongoing	pushback	against
globalisation	–	led	some	to	question	the	rationality	of	voters.	Lubos	Pastor	and
Pietro	Veronesi	(University	of	Chicago	Booth	School	of	Business)	present
a	framework	that	demonstrates	how	the	populist	backlash	against	globalisation
is	actually	a	rational	voter	response	when	the	economy	is	strong	and	inequality
is	high.	It	highlights	the	fragility	of	globalisation	in	a	democratic	society	that
values	equality.
The	ongoing	pushback	against	globalisation	in	the	West	is	a	defining	phenomenon	of	this	decade.	This	pushback	is
best	exemplified	by	two	momentous	2016	votes:	the	British	vote	to	leave	the	EU	(‘Brexit’)	and	the	election	of	a
protectionist,	Donald	Trump,	to	the	US	presidency.	In	both	cases,	rich-country	electorates	voted	to	take	a	step	back
from	the	long-standing	process	of	global	integration.	“Today,	globalisation	is	going	through	a	major	crisis”	(Macron
2018).
Some	commentators	question	the	wisdom	of	the	voters	responsible	for	this	pushback.	They	suggest	Brexit	and
Trump	supporters	have	been	confused	by	misleading	campaigns	and	foreign	hackers.	They	joke	about	turkeys
voting	for	Christmas.	They	call	for	another	Brexit	referendum,	which	would	allow	the	Leavers	to	correct	their
mistakes.
A	Front	National	rally	in	France,	2012.	Photo:	Blandine	Le	Cain	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
Rational	voters…
We	take	a	different	perspective.	In	a	recent	paper,	we	develop	a	theory	in	which	a	backlash	against	globalisation
happens	while	all	voters	are	perfectly	rational	(Pastor	and	Veronesi	2018).	We	do	not,	of	course,	claim	that	all	voters
are	rational;	we	simply	argue	that	explaining	the	backlash	does	not	require	irrationality.	Not	only	can	the	backlash
happen	in	our	theory;	it	is	inevitable.
We	build	a	heterogeneous-agent	equilibrium	model	in	which	a	backlash	against	globalisation	emerges	as	the	optimal
response	of	rational	voters	to	rising	inequality.	A	rise	in	inequality	has	been	observed	throughout	the	West	in	recent
decades	(e.g.	Atkinson	et	al.	2011).	In	our	model,	rising	inequality	is	a	natural	consequence	of	economic	growth.
Over	time,	global	growth	exacerbates	inequality,	which	eventually	leads	to	a	pushback	against	globalisation.
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…	who	dislike	inequality
Agents	in	our	model	like	consumption	but	dislike	inequality.	Individuals	may	prefer	equality	for	various	reasons.
Equality	helps	prevent	crime	and	preserve	social	stability.	Inequality	causes	status	anxiety	at	all	income	levels,	which
leads	to	health	and	social	problems	(Wilkinson	and	Pickett	2009,	2018).	In	surveys,	people	facing	less	inequality
report	being	happier	(e.g.	Morawetz	et	al.	1977,	Alesina	et	al.	2004,	Ferrer-i-Carbonell	and	Ramos	2014).
Experimental	results	also	point	to	egalitarian	preferences	(e.g.	Dawes	et	al.	2007).
We	measure	inequality	by	the	variance	of	consumption	shares	across	agents.	Given	our	other	modelling
assumptions,	equilibrium	consumption	develops	a	right-skewed	distribution	across	agents.	As	a	result,	inequality	is
driven	by	the	high	consumption	of	the	rich	rather	than	the	low	consumption	of	the	poor.	Aversion	to	inequality	thus
reflects	envy	of	the	economic	elites	rather	than	compassion	for	the	poor.
Besides	inequality	aversion,	our	model	features	heterogeneity	in	risk	aversion.	This	heterogeneity	generates	rising
inequality	in	a	growing	economy	because	less	risk-averse	agents	consume	a	growing	share	of	total	output.	We
employ	individual-level	differences	in	risk	aversion	to	capture	the	fact	that	some	individuals	benefit	more	from	global
growth	than	others.	In	addition,	we	interpret	country-level	differences	in	risk	aversion	as	differences	in	financial
development.	We	consider	two	‘countries’:	the	US	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	We	assume	that	US	agents	are	less	risk-
averse	than	rest-of-the-world	agents,	capturing	the	idea	that	the	US	is	more	financially	developed	than	the	rest	of	the
world.
At	the	outset,	the	two	countries	are	financially	integrated	–	there	are	no	barriers	to	trade	and	risk	is	shared	globally.
At	a	given	time,	both	countries	hold	elections	featuring	two	candidates.	The	‘mainstream’	candidate	promises	to
preserve	globalisation,	whereas	the	‘populist’	candidate	promises	to	end	it.	If	either	country	elects	a	populist,	a	move
to	autarky	takes	place	and	cross-border	trading	stops.	Elections	are	decided	by	the	median	voter.
Global	risk	sharing	exacerbates	US	inequality.	Given	their	low	risk	aversion,	US	agents	insure	the	agents	of	the	rest
of	the	world	by	holding	aggressive	and	disperse	portfolio	positions.	The	agents	holding	the	most	aggressive	positions
benefit	disproportionately	from	global	growth.	The	resulting	inequality	leads	some	US	voters,	those	who	feel	left
behind	by	globalisation,	to	vote	populist.
Why	vote	populist?
When	deciding	whether	to	vote	mainstream	or	populist,	US	agents	face	a	consumption-inequality	trade-off.	If	elected,
the	populist	delivers	lower	consumption	but	also	lower	inequality	to	US	agents.	After	a	move	to	autarky,	US	agents
can	no	longer	borrow	from	the	rest	of	the	world	to	finance	their	excess	consumption.	But	their	inequality	drops	too,
because	the	absence	of	cross-border	leverage	makes	their	portfolio	positions	less	disperse.
As	output	grows,	the	marginal	utility	of	consumption	declines,	and	US	agents	become	increasingly	willing	to	sacrifice
consumption	in	exchange	for	more	equality.	When	output	grows	large	enough—see	the	vertical	line	in	the	figure
below—more	than	half	of	US	agents	prefer	autarky	and	the	populist	wins	the	US	election.	This	is	our	main	result:	in	a
growing	economy,	the	populist	eventually	gets	elected.	In	a	democratic	society	that	values	equality,	globalisation
cannot	survive	in	the	long	run.
Figure	1	Vote	share	of	the	populist	candidate
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Equality	is	a	luxury	good
Equality	can	be	interpreted	as	a	luxury	good	in	that	society	demands	more	of	it	as	it	becomes	wealthier.	Voters	might
also	treat	culture,	traditions,	and	other	nonpecuniary	values	as	luxury	goods.	Consistent	with	this	argument,	the
recent	rise	in	populism	appears	predominantly	in	rich	countries.	In	poor	countries,	agents	are	not	willing	to	sacrifice
consumption	in	exchange	for	nonpecuniary	values.
Globalisation	would	survive	under	a	social	planner.	Our	competitive	market	solution	differs	from	the	social	planner
solution	due	to	the	negative	externality	that	the	elites	impose	on	others	through	their	high	consumption.	To	see	if
globalisation	can	be	saved	by	redistribution,	we	analyse	redistributive	policies	that	transfer	wealth	from	low	risk-
aversion	agents,	who	benefit	the	most	from	globalisation,	to	high	risk-aversion	agents,	who	benefit	the	least.	We
show	that	such	policies	can	delay	the	populist’s	victory,	but	cannot	prevent	it	from	happening	eventually.
Which	countries	are	populist?
Our	model	predicts	that	support	for	populism	should	be	stronger	in	countries	that	are	more	financially	developed,
more	unequal,	and	running	current	account	deficits.	Looking	across	29	developed	countries,	we	find	evidence
supporting	these	predictions.
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Figure	2	Vote	share	of	populist	parties	in	recent	elections
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The	US	and	the	UK	are	good	examples.	Both	have	high	financial	development,	large	inequality,	and	current	account
deficits.	It	is	thus	no	coincidence,	in	the	context	of	our	model,	that	these	countries	led	the	populist	wave	in	2016.	In
contrast,	Germany	is	less	financially	developed,	less	unequal,	and	it	runs	a	sizable	current	account	surplus.	Populism
has	been	relatively	subdued	in	Germany,	as	our	model	predicts.	The	model	emphasises	the	dark	side	of	financial
development	–	it	spurs	the	growth	of	inequality,	which	eventually	leads	to	a	populist	backlash.
Who	are	the	populist	voters?
The	model	also	makes	predictions	about	the	characteristics	of	populist	voters.	Compared	to	mainstream	voters,
populist	voters	should	be	more	inequality-averse	(i.e.	more	anti-elite)	and	more	risk-averse	(i.e.	better	insured
against	consumption	fluctuations).	Like	highly	risk-averse	agents,	poorer	and	less-educated	agents	have	less	to	lose
from	the	end	of	globalisation.	The	model	thus	predicts	that	these	agents	are	more	likely	to	vote	populist.	That	is
indeed	what	we	find	when	we	examine	the	characteristics	of	the	voters	who	supported	Brexit	in	the	2016	EU
referendum	and	Trump	in	the	2016	presidential	election.
The	model’s	predictions	for	asset	prices	are	also	interesting.	The	global	market	share	of	US	stocks	should	rise	in
anticipation	of	the	populist’s	victory.	Indeed,	the	US	share	of	the	global	stock	market	rose	steadily	before	the	2016
Trump	election.	The	US	bond	yields	should	be	unusually	low	before	the	populist’s	victory.	Indeed,	bond	yields	in	the
West	were	low	when	the	populist	wave	began.
Backlash	in	a	booming	economy
In	our	model,	a	populist	backlash	occurs	when	the	economy	is	strong	because	that	is	when	inequality	is	high.	The
model	helps	us	understand	why	the	backlash	is	occurring	now,	as	the	US	economy	is	booming.	The	economy	is
going	through	one	of	its	longest	macroeconomic	expansions	ever,	having	been	growing	steadily	for	almost	a	decade
since	the	2008	crisis.
This	study	relates	to	our	prior	work	at	the	intersection	of	finance	and	political	economy.	Here,	we	exploit	the	cross-
sectional	variation	in	risk	aversion,	whereas	in	our	2017	paper,	we	analyse	its	time	variation	(Pastor	and	Veronesi
2017).	In	the	latter	model,	time-varying	risk	aversion	generates	political	cycles	in	which	Democrats	and	Republicans
alternate	in	power,	with	higher	stock	returns	under	Democrats.	Our	previous	work	also	explores	links	between	risk
aversion	and	inequality	(Pastor	and	Veronesi	2016).
Conclusions
We	highlight	the	fragility	of	globalisation	in	a	democratic	society	that	values	equality.	In	our	model,	a	pushback
against	globalisation	arises	as	a	rational	voter	response.	When	a	country	grows	rich	enough,	it	becomes	willing	to
sacrifice	consumption	in	exchange	for	a	more	equal	society.	Redistribution	is	of	limited	value	in	our	frictionless,
complete-markets	model.	Our	formal	model	supports	the	narrative	of	Rodrik	(1997,	2000),	who	argues	that	we
cannot	have	all	three	of	global	economic	integration,	the	nation	state,	and	democratic	politics.
If	policymakers	want	to	save	globalisation,	they	need	to	make	the	world	look	different	from	our	model.	One	attractive
policy	option	is	to	improve	the	financial	systems	of	less-developed	countries.	Smaller	cross-country	differences	in
financial	development	would	mitigate	the	uneven	effects	of	cross-border	risk	sharing.	More	balanced	global	risk
sharing	would	result	in	lower	current	account	deficits	and,	eventually,	lower	inequality	in	the	rich	world.
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